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Time is money, and distance matters. We model the interaction of these truisms, and show the
implications for global specialization and trade: products where timely delivery is important will be
produced near the source of final demand, where wages will be higher as a result. In the model,
timely delivery is important because it allows retailers to respond to fluctuating final demand
without holding costly inventories, and timely delivery is only possible from nearby locations. Using
a unique dataset that allows us to measure the retail demand for timely delivery, we show that the
sources of US apparel imports have shifted in the way predicted by the model, with products where
timeliness matters increasingly imported from nearby countries.
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If you want to sell something, it helps to be close to your customers. This truism
leaves unanswered the question why proximity to one's market is good for
business. The answer given by economic geography is very simple: transportation
costs are increasing in distance, so it is more costly to deliver products to
consumers far away than to those near the production location. With mobile factors
of production, this "market access" motive leads to agglomeration near the source
of final demand. When factors cannot move, remote factors will be paid less in
equilibrium than those that are fortunate enough to be located near their customers.
Redding and Venables (2001) provide strong evidence for this inequality effect of
distance.
Another truism is "time is money". This explains why some goods are
shipped by air, even though surface transport is invariably cheaper: customers are
often willing to pay a substantial premium not to have to wait for their ship to
come in. As documented by Hummels (2001), the premium that must be paid for
air shipment far exceeds the interest cost savings on inventory in transit. This
strong urge to save time, even at great expense, implies a powerful force for
agglomeration and/or spatial inequality that is distinct from the transport-cost-
economizing motive emphasized in the economic geography literature.
This paper studies the interaction of these two truisms. We present a simple
model of the demand for timeliness and its implications for international
specialization and trade. The model is motivated by the experience of the global
apparel and textile industry, which saw two simultaneous trends in the 1990s. The
first was the rise of "lean retailing", a set of business practices made possible by
advances in information technology that allows retailers to hold small inventories
and respond rapidly to fluctuations in consumer demand. The second trend was a2
shift in the location of production away from lower wage locations in Asia toward
higher-wage locations in Mexico and the Caribbean.
1 We argue that these trends
are related: lean retailing creates a demand for timeliness, which can only be met
by producers located near the US market. Our model shows that the result of an
increased demand for timeliness is that wages will be higher in locations near the
source of final demand, with lower wage distant locations specializing in products
where timeliness is less important. This economic geography result comes from a
model where traditional transport costs are zero, and where there is constant
returns to scale in production.
An implication of our model is that the shift in the sourcing of US apparel
toward Mexico and the Caribbean is disproportionately concentrated in goods
where timeliness is important. We test this implication on a unique dataset that
combines product-level information from a major department store chain with
detailed information on trade flows and trade barriers. We find strong evidence that
nearby producers are increasingly specialized in goods where timeliness is
important to retailers, as predicted by the theory.
Our paper is one of a very few that study the importance of timeliness in
determining trade patterns, and the first to build careful microfoundations for the
demand for timeliness and provide empirical evidence on its importance. Deardorff
(2002) considers some of the same theoretical issues that we do in an insightful but
informal way. His conclusion that time-sensitive goods will be produced by
capital-intensive countries is a consequence of his assumption that speed is capital-
intensive. Deardorff also conjectures that remote countries are less likely to
specialize in time-intensive products, a result that we establish theoretically and
empirically. Venables (2001) discusses the tradeoff between proximity and
                                          
1Monthly manufacturing wages in Mexico were three times as high as in China in3
production costs, and argues that technological change that makes timely
production easier will lead to production shifting closer to the center, a result for
which we provide microfoundations below.
2 Flexible production and lean retailing
Selling clothing is a nerve-wracking business. Consumer tastes are volatile,
and retailers are haunted by the prospect of having to liquidate vast inventories of
unpopular clothing at the end of a selling season and, equally painfully, of running
short of suddenly popular styles. "Lean retailing," the combination of low
inventories and frequent restocking, offers a partial solution to these problems.
2
With low inventories, stores will not be stuck with large amounts of unsold goods
even if demand collapses. With frequent restocking, stores will not run short of
popular items. Lean retailing requires
1.  Bar codes, that allow retailers to keep daily track of sales of each of the tens of
thousands of products that they stock.
2.  Electronic data interchange, which is a system of linked computer networks
that make it possible for retailers to communicate quickly and cheaply with
suppliers.
3.  Modern distribution centers that rapidly channel goods from suppliers to sales
locations.
The essence of lean retailing is to respond rapidly to demand fluctuations
instead of holding large inventories. The final link is that production cannot be too
far from the sales location, because goods need to be moved quickly. This demand
for timeliness leads to a demand for proximity, since shipping time is increasing in
distance.
                                                                                                                                       
1998 (ILO website).
2 The discussion here is drawn from Abernathy et al (1999).4
Demand variability is not the same in all categories of apparel, of course.
Some items have very predictable demand, so that lean retailing offers little
benefit. Other goods have demand that is so unpredictable, and which have such
short selling seasons, that the classic inventory problem cannot be mitigated even
with deft application of lean retailing strategies. In the middle are goods that have
variable demand, and selling seasons that are long enough that it is feasible to
replenish supplies if demand conditions warrant. In the jargon of retail
management, goods that are ordered more than once per selling season are called
“replenishment” goods, while goods that are ordered only once per season are
"non-replenishment" items.
From the standpoint of producers, lean retailing demands great flexibility. If
they want to sell to lean retailers, producers must be able to adjust output rapidly
and ship products quickly. The benefit for flexible producers is that they can
charge a premium over their non-flexible competitors, who can only compete on
selling cost and not on timeliness.
We now turn to the implications of lean retailing for the equilibrium location
of production and international wage differentials.
3 Timeliness in general equilibrium: a model
The purpose of our model is to derive the equilibrium pattern of
specialization and wages in a world where flexible production is only possible if
production is located near the source of final demand. This assumption comes from
the more primitive assumption that distant production locations are sufficiently far
away that shipping times are too long to meet the deadlines required by lean
retailers. It is helpful to keep a stylized geography in mind, with the United States
being the source of final demand, the Caribbean/Mexico being adjacent to the US
and hence close enough to engage in flexible production, and Asia located so far
away that flexible production is impossible.5
We build the model in four stages. First, we derive optimal production for
flexible and non-flexible firms separately, where each risk-neutral firm sells a
unique product.
3 If all firms have identical costs, then flexible firms will make
greater profits, by the convexity of the profit function. This means that locations
where flexible production is impossible (Asia) can only compete if they offer
wages lower than those in locations where flexibility is possible (the Caribbean).
Second, we consider the tradeoff between flexibility and costs, and derive an
expression that shows that the number of firms locating in Asia is an increasing
function of the Caribbean's wage premium. Third, we derive the labor market
equilibrium conditions for the two regions for a given international division of
labor. Finally, we use the locational and labor market equilibrium conditions to
solve for the equilibrium wages and pattern of specialization.
3.1 The firm's production decision
The structure of the model is driven by demand. In each year, demand is
realized twice, and all firms have to make production decisions before the first
period. Firms with production locations nearby have the option of  producing again
after the first period, while firms with faraway plants do not have this flexibility.
For now, we take the location of firms as given. Inventory can be carried over at no
cost between periods within a year, but any inventory unsold at the end of the year
has a zero price in subsequent years.
An individual firm faces a linear inverse demand for its product in each period,
given by
p ab s =−⋅ (1)
where p is price, s is sales, and a and b are parameters. The source of uncertainty in
demand comes from fluctuations in the intercept a:
                                          
3 For our purposes, there is no benefit to modeling a separate retail sector, so we6
{ } , L H aa a ∈ (2)
where aH > aL, and the average value of a is a . The production function is as
simple as possible - output equals labor input, so that marginal cost is just equal to








The firm would obviously prefer to wait until demand is realized before it decides
what to produce. By assumption, all firms have to produce before first period
demand is realized, while only flexible firms can produce between periods.
In the appendix, we work out the details of optimal production plans for
risk-neutral firms, but the solution is intuitive. Non-flexible firms simply produce








where q is output, subscripts denote period production and the superscript N
identifies non-flexible firms, and q
∗  is just ex-ante optimal sales in each period.








If demand turns out to be low, they will sell the optimal amount given low demand,
and hold inventory into the next period.  We can summarize the flexible firm's







                                                                                                                                       


















The ex-post optimal amount to sell in the first period,  1
F s , depends on the
realization of  1 a  in the first period, and the firm's period 2 production just offsets
the demand surprise in period 1.















Note that first period sales by non-flexible firms respond less to demand shocks
than do the sales of flexible firms. Essentially, non-flexible firms hedge: if demand
is high in period 1, they sell less than if they were flexible, because they want to
make sure they have enough output to sell if demand is high in the second period.
Similarly, if demand is low in period 1, the firm sells more than it would if it were
flexible, because it doesn't want to be stuck with huge inventories if demand is low
again in the second period.
This analysis illustrates that even if demand is uncorrelated across periods
(as we assume for simplicity), flexible firms will always choose to produce twice,
so that they can take advantage of what happens in period 1. Average output and
sales for the two types of firms are the same, but output is more variable for the8
flexible firm, and it is this variation that leads to higher average profits for the
more flexible firm.
4
3.2 The firm's location decision
We now address the question of where firms locate. Clearly, if costs were
the same all firms would like to be flexible, and the demand for labor in the non-
flexible location, Asia (A), would be zero. If wages in the flexible location, the
Caribbean (C), are higher than in A, so that  ˆ 0 CA ww w =−>, then firms face a
tradeoff between the benefits of flexibility and the costs of paying higher wages. If
demand is very variable it may be worth paying the higher wages to get the
benefits of flexibility; but if demand is not very variable or if the wage differential
is large, firms will choose the non-flexible location.
For firms wishing to benefit from flexibility, an alternative to locating in C
is to locate in A and to ship goods by air instead of by ship. But airfreight is
expensive: for example, US importers paid a premium for air over surface
shipment that averaged 25% of the transported goods value in 1998 (Hummels,
2001).  To keep the focus on the trade-off between wage costs and flexibility, we
assume that the cost of airfreight exceeds the equilibrium wage savings from
producing in A.
While the degree of demand variability affects a firm's desire for flexibility,
the length of a product's selling season affects whether flexible production is
technically feasible. Some products (such as New Year's Eve gowns) have a very
short selling season, which makes reordering once initial demand is realized
impractical. Other products (such as men's white cotton underwear) are sold year
                                          
4 Note that  2 a  has no effect on second period sales for either type of firm -  2 s  is
predetermined once  1 a is realized. Nonetheless uncertainty in period 2 does have an
effect on the solution of the non-flexible firm's problem: first period sales would
respond more to  1 a if there were no uncertainty about  2 a .9
round, so that there is plenty of time to reorder once initial demand is realized.
Most products having selling seasons in between these extremes. In terms of our
model, the calendar time between periods might be two weeks for New Year's Eve
gowns and four months for men's white cotton underwear.
We now suppose that there is a continuum of monopolists indexed by i on
[0,1], all with identical cost functions and facing similar demand curves for the
products that they produce:
() () () p ia ib s i =− (6)
What distinguishes products from each other is length of the selling season and
variability of demand. Only a subset of goods have selling seasons long enough
that flexible production is technically feasible; of these, only some have demand
that is variable enough to make flexible production the profit maximizing strategy.
We order goods so that products in [0, iu) have long enough selling seasons for
flexibility to be feasible, where iu ≤  1 is a parameter. Firms located in  [ ,1] U ii ∈ are
technologically incapable of engaging in flexible production.
For the products in [0, iu), we order them so that variance in demand is
increasing in i. In particular, we suppose that the variance of a is proportional to i,
[ ]
2 () Va i iσ =⋅ ,[ 0 , ) U ii ∈ (7)
where 
2 σ  is a parameter.
5
Firms that are technologically capable of flexible production,  [0, ) U ii ∈ , will
choose the location that maximizes expected profits, trading off the benefits of
flexibility with the higher wages that must be paid to produce in C. For a given ˆ w,
firms with the least variable demand will choose to locate in A, while firms with
                                          
5 This proportionality assumption simply makes the algebra easier - all that is
required for the model is that there is a monotonic relationship between i and
V[a(i)]..10
more variable demand will choose to produce in C. The marginal firm, located at
L i , is just indifferent between producing in A or C, and this indifference defines a
relationship between  L i  and  ˆ w: the higher is  ˆ w the higher will be  L i , since fewer
firms will find it worthwhile to pay the higher wages necessary to produce in C.
We show in the appendix that this relationship is given by
() () ()
2
84 CA CA CA
L





We call this relationship the QQ curve, and it is graphed in Figure 1.
6 Note that so
far we have not ruled out the possibility that  ˆ w could be so high that  L U ii > , which
would imply that no firms want to locate in the high-cost Caribbean. We also don't
a priori rule out  ˆ 0 w < , but if this were the case no firms would want to locate in A.
3.3 Labor market equilibrium
We now turn to the labor market in each potential production location. In the
background is a Ricardian international trade model, where the United States has a
comparative disadvantage in apparel relative to C and A, who have identical
technology. We can pick parameter values and country sizes to guarantee that we
are in a complete specialization equilibrium, where the US produces only its'
comparative advantage good (call it machinery) and A and C produce only apparel.
Machinery will be our numeraire.
Aggregate labor supplies L in A and C are fixed. The average flexible
producer has per-period labor demand equal to average output q
∗ , so that total
annual labor demand per average flexible firm is 2q
∗ . Each non-flexible firm has
                                          
6 Equation (8) is a quadratic in wA and wC separately, which defines a three
dimensional surface in iL-wA-wC space. In the appendix, we show that the QQ curve
is the locus of equilibrium wage differentials as a function of iL.11
the same labor demand, so total demand from each non-flexible producer is also
2q
∗ .
The number of  flexible firms is given by the distance between the lower and
upper bounds  L i and  U i . As long as  UL ii >  this distance is just  UL ii − . Substituting
for  q
∗  and setting the demand for Caribbean labor equal to the fixed supply gives










If C were large enough to satisfy all the demand for labor by potentially flexible
firms at a zero wage then the model breaks down, so we assume that C is small







The remainder of the firms are inflexible and produce in A where wages are
cheaper.











Subtracting  A w  from  C w   gives an expression for the equilibrium wage differential









=−  +− − 
(12)
                                          
7 Firms i ∈  [0,iL) choose to produce in A because it is more profitable than
producing in C, while firms i ∈  (iU,1] produce in A because their selling seasons
are too short for flexible production to be feasible.12
For a technologically-fixed upper bound  U i , this relationship is convex and
decreasing in  L i : the larger the share of potentially flexible production that goes to
A, the lower is the wage differential between A and C. We call this the LL curve,
and it is illustrated in Figure 1.
8
3.4 General equilibrium
Putting the QQ and LL curves together gives our equilibrium, which is
illustrated in Figure 1. Wages are higher in C than in A, and as a consequence some
firms that are technologically capable of flexible production forgo that possibility
in favor of the cheap wages available in A. Other firms, who face greater demand
variability, find it worthwhile to pay the higher wages needed to produce in C.
As drawn the LL curve crosses the horizontal axis in the range (0,  U i ), which
guarantees that the equilibrium  (0, ) L U ii ∈  and therefore ˆ 0 w > . This is only










If this restriction is not satisfied, then  ˆ 0 w =  and  0 L i = . In this case, all of the
potentially flexible producers in the range [0, ) U i  and at least some of the firms in
the range [ ,1] U i  will produce in C. Note that this restriction is automatically
satisfied as  U i  approaches 1: since all firms value flexibility in the limit, no firm
will be willing to produce in A unless wages are lower there.
So far we have concentrated on the novel parts of our model, the production
decisions and the determination of  ˆ w. It is straightforward but uninteresting to
                                          
8 We verify in the appendix that the LL curve is convex and asymptotically
approaches  U i .13
close the model, so we simply sketch the solution here. In order to generate a
perfect specialization equilibrium, we assume that unit labor requirements for
apparel in all countries are equal to unity. In A and C, the unit labor requirement
for the numeraire is also unity, while it is less than one in the US. Residents of A
and C have no taste for apparel, consume only the numeraire good, and have
income only from labor. In a perfect specialization equilibrium, then, citizens in A
and C simply trade their labor income for imports of the numeraire good. Gains
from trade follow immediately.
Note, however, that the law of comparative advantage does not fully predict
trade patterns in this model. Since they have identical preferences and technology,
countries A and C have identical autarky prices. Not surprisingly, they do not trade
with each other in equilibrium. What is surprising is that they export disjoint sets
of products, and A gains less from trade than does C (since  ˆ w = 0 in autarky and  ˆ w
> 0 with trade). This is because geography is irrelevant in autarky but not when
trade is possible (see Deardorff (2001) for another example of this theoretical
phenomenon). The breakdown of comparative advantage has nothing to do with
increasing returns, which are absent in the model. Nor (unlike Deardorff’s model)
is it due to transportation costs, which are zero here. The reason geography matters
in our model is that shipping takes time, which makes proximity valuable even
though the cost of shipping (in the usual sense of a charge for moving goods) is
zero. Introducing shipping costs that increase with distance into our model would
accentuate the equilibrium wage differential  ˆ w, but would not alter the conclusion
that nearby countries specialize in goods where timely delivery is relatively
valuable.
                                                                                                                                       
9 to derive this inequality, set  ˆ 0 w =  and solve (12) for iL; imposing iL  > 0 then
gives the condition. Note that we now have two restrictions on the size of C: it
can't be too big either absolutely or relative to A.14
3.5 The spread of flexible production in general equilibrium
Abernathy et al (1999) make it clear that lean retailing spread slowly
through the apparel sector during the 1990s. As technology improved and as
management techniques diffused, more apparel firms became capable of producing
flexibly. We model this as an exogenous increase in  U i , with the newly capable
firms located in the interval  U i ∆ . With an increase in  U i , there are two possibilities:
1.  all the products in  U i ∆  have variance less than  ()
0 () L Va i ,
2.  at least some of the new products in  U i ∆  goods have variance greater than
()
0 () L Va i .
In the first case, there is no change in the equilibrium: the products in  U i ∆  were
produced in A before and they still are. Even though it is now technically feasible
for these products to be produced flexibly, it is not profitable to do so, so they stay
in A where wages are low.
In the second case, products U ji ∈∆  such that V[a(j)] >  ()
0 () L Va i  can be
produced more profitably in C than in A at the initial relative wage. This leads to a
shift in labor demand away from A toward C, and the consequences are illustrated
in Figure 2.
10  The LL curve shifts to the left, and  L i  also shifts left (to 
1
L i ) but by
less than  U i ∆ . As a result, wages rise in C relative to A, and the total number of
firms producing in C increases. This story matches the account given in Abernathy
et al (1999, Chapter 13): as more retailers adopted "lean retailing" strategies during
the 1990s in response to diffusion of technology and management practices
throughout the industry, this was matched by a shift of apparel sourcing from the15
Far East to the Caribbean Basin. Interestingly, in our model some producers shift
from C to A when  U i increases: these are firms who just found it worth paying high
C wages before, but who (given the small value they attach to flexibility) are now
priced out of C's labor market.
The model of this section gives two key empirical predictions:
1.  Products produced in high-wage locations near the source of final demand are
those that are ordered by final sellers more than once per selling season.
Apparel retailers call these "replenishment" goods. Goods produced in distant
low-wage locations are non-replenishment items.
2.  As information technology improves and spreads, making flexible production
feasible for a wider range of goods, it will cause shifts in the global pattern of
trade and income. Countries closer to large sources of final demand will benefit
at the expense of more remote locations.
This second prediction is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it is a result
about economic geography that comes from a model with no transport costs, no
increasing returns, and no Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. In this regard, our model is
similar to a von Thünen central place model, with the relatively transport-intensive
goods locating near the exogenously given center, and wages declining with
distance from the center, but our mechanism is wholly different. Second, it turns
predictions about the "death of distance" on their head: in our model,
improvements in communications technology make distance matter more for
incomes and trade in equilibrium, not less.
                                                                                                                                       
10 We draw Figure 2 using the simplifying assumption that V[a(j)] >  ()
0 () L Va i  ∀  j
∈  Diu. This makes drawing the figure neater but has no analytical consequences.
See the appendix for the details.16
4 Empirical Evidence
In evaluating our model, we focus on US imports of apparel. As Figure 3
shows, there has been a dramatic shift in the sourcing of US apparel imports, with
Mexico and Caribbean countries gaining at the expense of countries in Asia,
particularly China/Hong Kong. Our model gives one explanation for this shift, but
there are at least two others that are potentially important: changes in comparative
advantage and changes in trade policy.
4.1 Labor costs
Apparel is an unskilled-labor intensive traded good, and is often considered
the archetypal footloose manufactured product, with capitalists scouring the globe
for the lowest wages. On this view, what matters for competitive advantage in
apparel is low wages. It is difficult to get comparable data on wages in apparel
production around the world, and impossible to get productivity-adjusted wages.
As a first step, Table 1 shows the relative wage in overall manufacturing for China
and Mexico from 1991 to 1998. The table illustrates that China has much lower
wages than Mexico, but the ratio shrank from nearly 9 at the beginning of the
decade to just over 3 in 1998. However, most of the drop in Mexican relative
wages occurred  between 1991 and 1995, and has stayed fairly flat since then. This
is inconsistent with the behavior of market shares seen in Figure 3, in which
Mexico's share accelerated in mid-decade. Furthermore, wages remain much
higher in levels in Mexico than in China. Our tentative conclusion is that falling
Mexican relative wages may have contributed to Mexico's growing success in
exporting apparel, but do not completely explain it.
4.2 Trade Policy
A second explanation for changing trade patterns is changes in trade policy.
The dominant instrument of trade policy for textiles and apparel is the Multi Fiber
Arrangement or MFA, a Byzantine system of bilateral product specific quotas that17
dates back to the 1950s and which is very slowly being phased out.
11 No analysis
of apparel trade can be credible without accounting for the MFA, so we do just
that.
The MFA is extremely opaque, and to our knowledge we are the first
researchers to assemble a comprehensive product-level time series on the US MFA
program, which is administered by a division of the Commerce Department called
the Office of Textiles and Apparel or OTEXA.
12 Quota levels vary by product,
year, and trading partner. We obtained records on the levels of all apparel quotas
from 1990 to 1998, along with the "fill rate", which is the percentage of the quota
used. OTEXA uses their own import classification system to administer the MFA,
which has no simple relationship to any other US or international system of
reporting trade data.
13 The product categories are broken down by type of fiber
(cotton, wool, silk, man-made, and other), and are fairly broad: categories include
"dresses," "sweaters," "underwear," and the like.
Our trade data on apparel imports, tariffs, and transport costs come from
CD-ROMS purchased from the US Commerce Department. This data is reported at
the 10-digit HS level, which is the finest level of disaggregation available. Among
other things, the data includes information on import values, import quantities,
tariffs, transport costs, and source country. In analyzing the data, we aggregate up
to the OTEXA import classification system.
Figure 4 summarizes the quota data. It shows a histogram of quota fill rates
across all sources of apparel imports, weighted by import values.
14 If we define a
                                          
11 It is due to disappear completely in 2005.
12 OTEXA's website is fairly informative, and can be found at
http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/default.htm
13 The system is documented at http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/corr.stm
14 Imports that are not subject to any quota at all can be thought of as facing an
infinite quota and hence have a zero fill rate.18
binding quota as one with a fill rate of 90% or above, Figure 4 shows that about 40
percent of US apparel imports came in under binding quotas throughout the 1990s,
and that there has been very little change in this proportion despite the
liberalization promised under the Uruguay Round.
Tariffs also remain an important trade restriction for US apparel imports.
Figure 5 shows the incidence of tariffs, and contrary to the quotas seen in Figure 4,
there is clear evidence of liberalization: in 1990 and 1991, about half of US
imports paid tariffs of over 16%, and virtually none came in duty-free. By 1998,
high tariffs were much less prevalent, and about 20% entered nearly duty free
(with tariffs of less than 2%).
The overall trends visible in Figures 4 and 5 obscure important variation
across trading partners. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the importance of two important
trade policy initiatives, NAFTA and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Figure 6
shows that in 1990, Mexico and the Caribbean faced tariffs similar to those faced
by other US import sources. By 1998, Mexico had very privileged access, with
virtually all apparel imports entering with at most nominal tariffs. The Caribbean
saw less dramatic changes over the decade, but clearly these countries’ market
access relative to all countries other than Mexico improved significantly.
Figures 8 and 9 show the regional evolution of MFA incidence.
Interestingly, both Mexico and the Caribbean faced more binding quotas at the end
of the decade than they did in 1990, perhaps reflecting a political economy
response to rapid import growth from these regions (alternatively, unchanged
quotas may have become binding as import demand grew). East Asia, China, and
Hong Kong did not see major changes in their incidence of binding quotas, while
South Asia saw a big increase: in 1990 less than 20 percent of South Asian imports
entered under a binding quota, and this proportion almost quadrupled by 1998.19
This eyeball analysis of trade policy strongly suggests that NAFTA and the
CBI are at least partly responsible for the shifts in apparel import sourcing seen in
Figure 3. The analysis also suggests that controlling for the effects of the MFA is
crucial, since such a large share of apparel imports come in under binding quotas.
4.3 Product characteristics and trade: testing the demand for timeliness model
In this section we develop an empirical model that allows us to test a central
implication of our model while taking account of other important determinants of
apparel imports.
The model predicts that apparel products that are subject to rapid retail
replenishment will be sourced from countries close to the US, where they can be
imported quickly in response to changing demand conditions. We use a unique,
proprietary data source from a major department store chain to identify such
products. The chain has stores all across the country, and we have information on
clothing sales at all of their stores in 2001, including which items are replenished
and in what proportions. These replenishment proportions are aggregated across
stores and product lines to give aggregate replenishment proportions by broad
product category. Confidentiality precludes us from illustrating this data, but the
range of replenishment across products is from 0 to 67%.
Our approach to testing the model is simple: we specify a reduced form
equation for desired imports, and assume that actual imports are given by the
minimum of desired imports and the exogenous import quota. With the notation
mict = log level of real (physical quantity) imports of product i from country
c in year t,
*
ict m  = log unconstrained imports, and




ict m , qict ]
(14)
Unconstrained imports depend on country-time and product-time dummies, as well
as ad-valorem trade resistance including tariffs and transport costs, given by tict:
*
ict m = mit + mct + atict 
(15)
We assume that timeliness was irrelevant in period 1, because the development of
lean retailing was in its infancy at the beginning of the 1990s. By the end of our
sample in 1998, our model predicts that replenishment product categories will be
sourced from countries near the US. We capture this with an interaction effect
between replenishment proportion ri and a dummy dc for proximity to the US
(equal to one for Mexico and the Caribbean countries). The level equation for
unconstrained imports in each period becomes
*
1 ic m = mi1 + mc1 +  atic1
(16)
*
2 ic m = mi2 + mc2 +  atic2 + β ridc
Looking at import growth from period 1 to 2, there are four possible situations:
a. Quota binds in both periods ic ic mq ∆= ∆ (17a)
b. Quota slack in both periods ic i c ic i c mr d µµ ατ β ∆=++ ∆ + (17b)
c. Quota binds in 1
st period only 22 2 1 ic i c ic i c ic mr d q µµ ατ β ∆=+ + + − (17c)
d. Quota binds in 2
nd period only 11 12 ic i c ic ic mq µµ ατ ∆=+− + (17d)
Since our primary interest is in estimating the importance of timeliness on import
growth, which is measured by β , observations in cases a and d are irrelevant. As it
happens, there are only a very small number of observations in case c, so we focus21
on estimating the model using solely observations where imports were
unconstrained in both periods, equation (17b) (where we define µ i = µ i2 - µ i1, µ c =
µ c2 - µ c1).
While simple, the specification in (17b) controls for most of the factors that
could affect import growth. The country dummies µ c control for influences such as
factor prices, the country's average level of tariffs and quota restrictiveness, and
other country-specific effects. The product dummies µ i account for the average rate
of growth of imports in the category, as well as the average world level of tariffs
and quotas on that product. We assume that, aside from trade costs and the
timeliness effect, all other idiosyncratic influences on imports are orthogonal, and
we summarize their effect in a residual error term. The timeliness effect β  answers
the question: do imports of high-replenishment goods grow more rapidly from
Mexico and the Caribbean than they do from the rest of the world? Our model says
the answer is yes, and predicts β  > 0.
We estimate (17b) on a panel of apparel import growth across products and
countries, over the period 1991 to 1998. Rather than look at year-to-year variation,
we focus on total growth over the seven-year period. There are 3,177 observations
in our full sample, of which 2,753 are not quota constrained and are therefore
appropriate for estimating the regression model. Table 2 gives summary statistics
for the full and unconstrained sample; our comments here will refer to the latter. A
remarkable feature of the data is how skewed the distribution of import growth is:
the median is a fast but reasonable 50%, while the mean is an outlandish 6,763%.
This arises because for a substantial share of the observations, imports were
extremely low in 1991 and large in 1998, so that many growth rates are very high
(in fact, the 75
th percentile of import growth is over 400%). Of course many other
growth rates are negative, with the 25
th percentile equal to -60%.22
The change in trade frictions is less skewed, with a mean of -4.52 percentage
points and a median of -2.87 percentage points, but there is a lot of variation (the
standard deviation of the change in trade frictions is 14 percentage points). Most of
the fall in trade frictions is due to declining tariffs rather than falling transport costs
(-2.9 and -1.6 percentage points on average respectively). Three-quarters of all the
changes in trade barriers were negative, reflecting the broad reductions in tariff
barriers seen in Figure 5.
The extreme skewness of import growth suggests that an estimator that
assumes a symmetrical distribution will be inefficient and probably misleading.
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=⋅ , is the change
divided by the initial level, while bounded growth is the change divided by an
average of the beginning and ending period levels. As a result, this measure, used
by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) in their studies of manufacturing plant
growth, is well-defined even if beginning period imports are zero (so that ordinary
growth would be infinite). It ranges from a minimum of -200 when end of period
imports are zero to +200 when beginning period imports are zero. It is related to








which, for moderate values of g, means that G is almost the same as g. As seen in
Table 2, bounded growth is far less skewed than ordinary growth, with a mean of
25% and a median of 40% (note that median for bounded growth is virtually the
same as the median for ordinary growth).23
Tables 3 through 5 are the core of our data analysis. We focus on the
estimates for bounded growth, but report results for ordinary growth for
completeness. The top panel of Table 3 reports some descriptive regressions that
illustrate the correlations in the complete sample as well as the non-quota-
constrained sample. Our central specification is reported in the second panel of
Table 3, where we regress bounded growth on the proximity-replenishment
interaction and the change in trade barriers, including a complete set of country
and product fixed effects (this is the specification given in equation 17b). We
calculate t-statistics three ways: the usual OLS formula, White heteroskedasticity-
consistent (labeled “robust std. errs.”), and bootstrap. We also report results from a
robust regression estimator, which is an iterative weighted least squares procedure
that endogenously downweights outliers. The inference is the same across these
four estimators: the proximity-replenishment effect β  is about one, with a t-statistic
above 3. How big is this effect? Since the range of the replenishment variable is
between 0 and 67 percent, an estimated β  of 1.04 implies that high-replenishment
products from nearby countries grew 1.04× 67 = 70 percentage points faster than
otherwise. This is a big effect: it is more than 2.5 times faster than the mean level
of bounded growth, and almost half again as fast as median growth. For products
where replenishment is less important, with a replenishment percentage of 25%,
the estimates still imply a big proximity effect, with imports growing 26
percentage points faster from nearby countries than more remote sources.
A feature of our data analysis is that we are pooling across trade flows of
very different sizes, so it is of interest to look at the sensitivity of our results to
regression weighting. The final two rows of Table 3 report weighted least squares
results. When weighted by beginning-period imports, the inference about β  is not24
much changed, with a point estimate of 0.85. Weighting by end of period imports,
however, reverses the inference, indicating a small negative effect.
It is instructive to compare the replenishment-proximity effect with the
effect of falling trade frictions. Multiplying the estimated trade friction semi-
elasticity of -1.47 by the mean drop in trade frictions of 4.5 percentage points gives
an effect on growth of 5.7 percentage points: a substantial effect, but small relative
to mean import growth and the size of the replenishment-proximity effect.
Table 4 estimates the same specifications as Table 3, except ordinary rather
than bounded growth is the dependent variable. The OLS estimate for β  is an
outlandish 787, although its standard error is quite large. Taking this estimate at
face value implies an absurd 53,000 percentage point effect of proximity on import
growth of high-replenishment products. Scaling this effect by the standard
deviation of import growth (from Table 2) makes this number somewhat more
meaningful, and implies that imports of high-replenishment goods from nearby-
countries grew  0.64 standard deviations faster than from remote sources. The
robust regression estimator, which effectively throws out extremely large and small
values of growth because they are such outliers from the OLS line, delivers a result
quite comparable to the results from Table 4, with an estimated  β  of 1.50.
The instability of the results of Table 4 induces a suspicion that a small
number of outliers are driving the results, and we check this in Table 5. We
identify outliers from first-stage regressions using the DFITS statistic, discard
values for which DFITS  > 2
k
N
, and re-estimate the equations (see Belsley, Kuh,
and Welsch, 1980, for the logic behind this procedure). The top panel of Table 5
shows that this procedure identifies a number of outliers when the dependent
variable is bounded growth, but that inferences about the size of β  are hardly25
affected. The bottom panel, by contrast, shows  that inferences when the dependent
variable is regular growth are completely dominated by a tiny number of outliers:
dropping just 22 observations (0.8% of the sample) makes the estimated β
statistically insignificant. Robust regression, which iteratively weights the
remaining observations, yields a plausible point estimate of β  =1.6, close to the
estimates for β   from the bounded growth regressions.
Our conclusion from the data analysis is that β   is close to one. This is a big
effect, both relative to the variation in the data and relative to the effect of falling
trade frictions. While our empirical model cannot shed light on other determinants
of changing trade flows, such as shifting comparative advantage and changes in
quotas, it does control for them statistically. Overall, our results are consistent with
the theoretical model: an increased demand for timeliness by retailers has led to a
noticeable shift in trade patterns, with rapid-replenishment goods increasingly
sourced from nearby countries.
5 Summary and conclusions
This paper has discussed some general equilibrium implications of the
aphorism "time is money". In our model the demand for timeliness arises from
variability in final demand, and we have showed that this has implications for
international specialization: countries that are located close to major markets will
have higher wages because they specialize in getting goods to market quickly. That
countries close to the core are better off than peripheral countries is a common
implication of economic geography models both new and old (see Fujita et al for
an inventory), but our mechanism is new, and does not rely on the usual
assumptions of transport costs and increasing returns to scale. Our model also
offers an alternative explanation for the powerful effect of distance in empirical
gravity equations: distance is proxying for time to market, not shipping costs.26
We looked at data on the evolution of apparel imports into the US to see if
an increased demand for timeliness has affected the pattern of trade. The answer is
yes: products where timeliness is important grew much faster from nearby
countries than they did from the traditional sources of US apparel imports in East
and South Asia.
The core idea behind the paper is that time matters, a cliche that has major
implications for economic geography but which seems to have been neglected by
theorists. We have developed some implications for international trade and
inequality, but the general idea can be used to model agglomeration and regional
inequality as well. It should also prove useful to develop models where the demand
for timeliness comes from producers rather than final consumers, as suggested by
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Source: International Labour Organisation
Figure 3 - Market Shares for US Apparel Imports, 1990-9830
histogram weighted by import values
Figure 4 - Distribution of quota fill rates, 1990-98
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Figure 6 - Tariff incidence by region, 1990
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Figure 7 - Tariff incidence by region, 1998
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histogram weighted by import values
Figure 8 - Quota incidence by region, 1990
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Figure 9 - Quota incidence by region, 1998
quota fill rate, %
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Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
full sample (N = 3,177)
import growth, % 6,395 49.7 82,123 -100 3,657,900
bounded import
growth, % 25.8 40.0 123 -200 200
change in trade
barriers, % points -4.52 -3.00 14.2 -136 230
change in tariffs, %
points -2.77 -0.89 7.8 -83.7 33.3
change in transport
costs, % points -1.75 -1.22 11.4 -128 238
not quota constrained sample (N= 2,753)
import growth, % 6,763 50 84,407 -99 3,657,900
bounded import
growth, %
24.6 40.3 127 -200 200
change in trade
barriers, % points
-4.54 -2.9 15 -136 230
change in tariffs,
% points
-2.94 -0.9 8.2 -83.7 33.3
change in transport
costs, % points
-1.61 -1.2 11.4 -128 23834
Table 3 - Bounded import growth 1991-1998








































3b Central specification - all regressions include country and product
fixed effects. Sample is observations not constrained by quotas (N




























Notes to Table N: Dependent variable is bounded import growth
















Table 4 - Import growth 1991-1998








































4b Central specification - all regressions include country and product
fixed effects. Sample is observations not constrained by quotas (N




























Notes to Table 4: Dependent variable is percentage import growth














Table 5 - Sensitivity to outliers
5a Bounded import growth, central specification without outliers - all
regressions include country and product fixed effects. 82 outliers




























5b regular import growth, central specification without outliers - all
regressions include country and product fixed effects. 22 outliers




























Notes to Table 5: Outliers are unusually influential observations, as
defined by the DFFITS statistic computed in the central specification.
See the text for details.37
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